Platform / Identity verification
Verify the person, not just the paperwork.
Every credentialing system on the market verifies documents. None of them verify that the person holding those documents is who they say they are. Bip starts there.
Every layer above takes the layer below on faith. Nothing in credentialing was designed to look down.
Why it matters
Verification chains inherit trust.
Each check downstream assumes the one upstream was sound. A credential built on a fraudulent foundation verifies cleanly at every step after it, because no step after it was designed to look down.
Fraudulent nursing diplomas traced to a handful of schools. The people holding them sat real board exams, received real licenses, and passed credentialing at real facilities. Every downstream check worked exactly as designed.
This is not a story about weak verification. It is a story about verification that never reached the bottom of the stack.
How it works
Establish the person first. Then keep the binding current.
Bip applies the sequence a financial institution uses before it opens an account, to the moment a provider enters your system.
The person is established
Government ID authenticated when the provider joins, before credentials are anchored to them. Not a name-and-NPI match against a public registry.
Credentials attach to a person
The record is anchored to that established identity rather than to a name string, so the file has a human being underneath it rather than an assumption.
Attestation re-affirms it
The provider confirms their record section by section, on a date. Each attestation is timestamped and written to the file’s event log.
Bip came out of identity, fraud and compliance work, not credentialing services. That is why the sequence starts here rather than ending here.
Where this is today
What the platform does, and what it is designed to do.
Credentialing buyers are trained to find the gap between a claim and a capability. Here is ours, before you have to go looking for it.
- Government ID authentication at enrollment
- Provider attestation at field and section level, timestamped
- License verification against the issuing state board
- Monthly OIG LEIE exclusion screening
- Expirables monitoring and alerting
- Relay provenance — hash-chained, append-only event history
- BipSubmit portal fill across payer and facility portals
- Bylaws extraction into a privilege delineation matrix
- Privileging end to end, from delineation through committee packet
- HIPAA audit trail across both surfaces
- Binding extended across all credential domains in the file
- Full primary source verification coverage
- Passport API for third-party consumption
We would rather lose a deal on this table than win one and have it surface in a security review.
What we do not publish
We will not tell you how the verification works.
Not on this page, not in a deck, not to a prospect. This is deliberate, and it is worth explaining why.
- Publishing the method tells anyone attempting to defeat it precisely what they have to defeat.
- Naming a vendor dates the claim the moment the vendor changes, and invites a spec argument in place of a conversation about your risk.
- The people asking hardest are rarely buyers. They are frequently the ones probing for the seam.
Under a security review and an NDA, the detail is available in full. In public, the claim is what the file proves, never how.
Questions we get
Identity in credentialing, plainly.
What is identity binding in credentialing?
Why is verifying an NPI not enough?
Does identity verification replace primary source verification?
What was Operation Nightingale, and why does it matter here?
Does a provider have to verify again at every facility?
See what a file looks like with a person underneath it.
Bring one provider. We will walk the whole chain with you, from the identity up.